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DIAMOND' IS THE RTC'S BEST FRIEND:
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE
BALANCE OF THE TERM OF RENT
REGULATED LEASES IN RESOLUTION
TRUST CORPORATION v. DIAMOND
I.

Introduction

Sam and Patricia Smith are very lucky people. For over forty
years, they have lived in a seven room apartment on the upper-east
side of New York: the most expensive part of the city. While many
of their neighbors pay several thousand dollars of rent per month,
the Smiths pay only two hundred dollars per month. Their apartment is regulated by the New York City rent regulations.
Through a default of the landlord under its mortgage, title to this
apartment passed to Alpha Savings and Loan Association which
was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"). Unfortunately, the building with the Smiths' apartment
was not the only near worthless asset Alpha Savings and Loan
owned. Alpha Savings and Loan soon failed, and the Resolution
Trust Corporation ("RTC") became its receiver. The RTC's first
action was to disaffirm the Smiths' lease through its disaffirmance
powers set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1).
The conflict between the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) 2 and the New York
City rent regulations contained in this hypothetical situation, is the
subject of this Note. In Resolution Trust Corporationv. Diamond,
the RTC sought to disaffirm leases regulated by the New York City
rent regulations. 4
1. Resolution Trust Corporation [hereinafter "RTC"] v. Diamond, 18 F.3d 111
(2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Diamond 1], vacated, remanded sub nom., Solomon v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 115 S. Ct. 43 (1994), and vacated, remanded sub nom.,

Pattullo v. Resolution Trust Corp., 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994), and on recons., reinstated, in
part, modified, remanded, RTC v. Diamond, 45 F.3d 665 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
Diamond 11], cert. denied, Solomon v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995), and cert. denied,

Pattullo v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
3. New York, N.Y., RENT CONTROL, CITY RENT AND REHABILITATION LAW
§ 26-401 - § 26-415 (1992) [hereinafter, RENT CONTROL CODE]; New York, N.Y.,
RENT STABILIZATION, RENT STABILIZATION LAW OF 1969, § 26-501 - § 26-520 (1992)
[hereinafter, RENT STABILIZATION CODE].
4. Diamond, 18 F.3d at 115.
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Congress passed FIRREA in response to the 1980s debacle in
the savings and loan industry. 5 Through this statute, the Federal
Government spent over a hundred of billion dollars to insure the

continuity and safety of the nation's banking industry.6 FIRREA
made vast changes to a host of banking regulations and created the

RTC. 7 The RTC's function is to manage and resolve cases where a

conservator or receiver has been appointed to an institution insured by the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, as
well as to manage and liquidate the Federal Asset Disposition

Association.8
New York City passed the New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law ("rent control") 9 and the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969
("rent stabilization") 10 in response to a housing crisis." Together,

these provisions (collectively, the "rent regulations") provide an
extensive framework, whereby the rents for affected apartments

are fixed by law.' 2 The explicit goal of the rent
regulations is to
3
increase the availability of affordable housing.'
In 1991, the rent regulations and FIRREA clashed in RTC v.

Diamond.4 The RTC had become receiver of a failed savings and
loan, Nassau Federal Savings and Loan.' 5 In 1990, the RTC, as

receiver, repudiated nine rent regulated apartment leases,' 6 pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e), which gives receivers the right to repudiate burdensome contracts and leases.' 7 The RTC initiated suit in
federal district court against the tenants to compel them to vacate
5. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 98 - 99.

6. See infra note 56 and the accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 58 and 59 and the accompanying text.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1421(b)(3)(A), (B); 12 U.S.C. § 1421(0. See infra note 60 and the
accompanying text.
9. See supra note 3.
10. See supra note 3.
11. RENT

CONTROL CODE

§ 26-401; RENT

STABILIZATION CODE

§ 26-501.

12. See infra part II.A.
13. See supra note 11. See also infra notes 29 - 31 and 34 and the accompanying
text.
14. 801 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), reversed by Diamond 1, 18 F.3d 111
(2d Cir. 1994), vacated, remanded sub nom., Solomon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 115
S. Ct. 43 (1994), vacated, remanded sub nom., Pattullo v. Resolution Trust Corp., 115
S. Ct. 44 (1994), and on recons., reinstated, in part, modified, remanded, Diamond 11,
45 F.3d 665 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Solomon v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995), and
cert. denied, Pattullo v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995).
15. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 115.
16. Id.
17. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 331 (1989), reprinted in, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 127; infra note 63 and the accompanying text.
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the premises. 18 The district court granted summary judgment for
the tenants, holding that the rent regulations created "statutory

tenancies."' 19 Those tenancies, according to the district court, are
creatures of statute, not common law leases originating from an
agreement of two or more parties.2 0 Therefore, the district court
held that the tenancies were beyond the scope of the RTC's disafwhich allow them to repudiate only "contracts
firmance powers,
21

and leases."
In March 1994, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the repudiation powers granted to the RTC by FIRREA preempted the
New York City rent regulations.22 The court, however, gave the
lessees the option to remain in their apartments for the balance of
the term of their leases, as is required by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(5)(A). 23 The court further held that the term of a rent
controlled lease is two years.24 In October 1994, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the case 25 because of the Court's decision in O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Company, which had been issued three months after the Second
Circuit's decision. 26 In February 1995, the Second Circuit reinstated its earlier decision, holding that O'Melveny did not affect its
reasoning. 27
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the New York City
rent regulations and FIRREA and discusses their relevance to the
Diamond decisions. Part III of this Note describes the reasons the
RTC should be allowed to repudiate the tenancies, based on express and conflict preemption analyses. Part IV addresses the
18. The RTC also named, as defendants, the Attorney General of New York and
the Commissioner of the Division of Housing and Community Renewal. Diamond,
801 F. Supp. at 1154.
19. Id. at 1159, 1164.
20. Id. at 1159.
21. The repudiation powers are derived from 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. 1993).
For a more thorough analysis of this opinion, see infra Part II.C.
22. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d 111.
23. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 124.
24. Id.
25. Solomon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 115 S. Ct. 43 (1994); Pattullo v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994).
26. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994). O'Melveny held that state law governed the issue of
whether the knowledge of corporate officers acting against the corporation's interest
will be imputed to the FDIC when it sues as receiver of the corporation. Thus, Diamond I was vacated and remanded to allow the Second Circuit to consider the case in
light of O'Melveny. For a more in depth analysis, see infra Part II.D.
27. Diamond II, 45 F.3d 665 (2d. Cir 1995). For a more thorough analysis of this
opinion, see infra part II.E.
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length of the balance of the term of a rent regulated lease. Part V
concludes that the rent regulated leases may be repudiated by the
RTC, that the balance of the term of a rent stabilized lease is the

remaining time in the renewal period, and that more statutory guidance is needed to resolve what is the balance of the term of a rent
controlled lease.
II. Background
A. Nature of Rent Regulations in New York City28
After World War II, a housing crisis existed in New York City.29
The New York State legislature passed the Local Emergency Hous-

ing Rent Control Act in 1962 to alleviate the shortage of affordable, well-maintained housing. 30 New York City responded quickly
by enacting rent control. 31 Rent control applies to "any building or
structure.., occupied.., by one or more individuals.., which is

not owned by the city and which was rented prior to May [1,
1950], ' '32 and completed before February, 1947. 33
28. See generally Martin A. Shlufman, Rent Control and Rent Stabilization in New
York State, 396 PLI/REAL 169 (1993); Symposium, Rent Control and the Theory of
Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 727 (1988); UPDATE - THE NEW RENT
STABILIZATION CODE (Committee on Landlord and Tenant of the Real Property Law
Section and the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the New York State
Bar Association).
29. See RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-401, which states, in its relevant part,
The council hereby finds that a serious public emergency continues to exist
in the housing of a considerable number of persons in the city, which emergency was created by war, the effects of war and the aftermath... that there
continues to be an acute shortage of dwellings ...

that preventive action

through enactment of local legislation by the council continues to be imperative ....

30. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8602-03 (McKinney 1987). The Local Emergency
Housing Rent Control Act granted New York City, along with other cities in the state,
the right to enact local rent control laws, administer such laws, and issue regulations
pursuant to such laws. This law was actually a successor to the Emergency Housing
Rent Control Law passed in 1946. See generally Festa v. Leshen, 537 N.Y.S.2d 147
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
31. RENT CONTROL CODE.
32. RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-403e.1.
33. RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-403e.2. (which actually reads, "[t]he term 'housing
accomodation' shall not include: ... (h) ... houring accommodations which were

completed on or after February First, nineteen hundred forty-seven."). Several exceptions are enumerated, however. Id. at § 26-403e.2. They include, among others,
charitable or educational institutions, Id. at § 26-403e.2.(b); some hotels, Id. at § 26403e.2.(c); motor courts, Id. at § 26-403e.2.(d); housing accommodations owned and
operated by the United States, New York State, or the New York Housing Authority,
Id. at § 26-403e.2.(f); and, "nonhousekeeping furnished housing accommodations located within a single dwelling unit ... but only if: (1) no more than two tenants... (2)
the remaining portion of such unit is occupied by the landlord ... " Id. at § 24-403e.2.
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In 1969, the New York City Council, noting that "a serious emergency continues to exist" in the city, added the rent stabilization
code to the existing rent regulations.3 Rent stabilization applies to
all units completed after February 1, 1947, containing six or more
units, which are not owned as cooperatives or condominiums,35 and

are not located in a building for which a certificate of occupancy
was obtained after March 10, 1969.36 Taken together, the rent reg-

ulations are an attempt by the City of New York to insure the availby fixing the rents of many apartments
ability of affordable housing
37
within the city limits.
Rent control determines an apartment's rent by fixing it at approximately the rate charged in 1962.38 Since 1974, landlords can
adjust the maximum rent biennially. 39 Even if rent control allows a

landlord to adjust the maximum rent, the landlord cannot increase
the rent more than 7.5% in any one year,4 0 and all decisions to

raise rents must be made after a public hearing.4 ' In addition, the
34. RENT STABILIZATION CODE.
35. Id. at § 26-504a.
36. Id. at § 26-504a.(1)(d). Notable exemptions from rent stabilization include
housing subject to any state rent regulation, units that become vacant after June 30,
1971, and units not occupied as primary residence as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at § 26-504a.(1).
37. The Diamond case also concerns the Martin Act, New York's blue sky law,
which implements certain provisions of the rent regulations. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW.
§ 352-eeee2(c). The law creates regulations dealing with the conversion of apartment
buildings to cooperative corporations ("Co-ops") and condominium apartments.
While it is true that the Martin Act applies to the apartments in the Diamond case,
and the rent regulations apply to those apartments through that process, the details of
the Martin Act are beyond the scope this note. As the Second Circuit, in Diamond I
ruled, "The Martin Act ... alters our analysis not at all. . . '[N]o private action has
been expressly authorized' in the Martin Act... The Martin Act thus does no more
than require that certain statements be included in the offering documents." Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 121 (quoting CPC Int'l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116,
118 (N.Y. 1987)).
38. Rent control determined the rent by first establishing a formula to determine
the maximum gross building rental for each building. The maximum gross building
rental was computed by combining, "real estate taxes, water rates and sewer charges
and an operation and maintenance expense allowance, a vacancy allowance not in
excess of two [percent], and a collection loss allowance, and an eight and one-half
[percent] return on capital value." RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-405(3). It then allocates a percentage of this total to each housing accommodation within the building to
set the initial maximum chargeable rent for each apartment, as of April 30, 1962. Id.
at § 26-405(1). Consideration was to be given to the size and location of the housing
accommodations. Id. at 26-405(3).
39. Id. at § 26-405(4). There were, however, a set of increases built into the code
that went into effect prior to 1972. Id. at § 26-405(2).
40. Id. at § 26-405(5).
41. Id. at § 26-405(9)(a).
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broad discretionary power granted to the city rent agency by the
rent regulations may have a further impact on the ability of landlords to raise rents.42 Thus, under rent control, if the tenant does

not vacate the apartment and continues to pay rent, it is extremely
difficult for the landlord to raise the rent.
One of the major differences between rent control and rent sta-

bilization is the length of the term of the lease. Rent control provides for a somewhat fixed rent, extending the term for as long as
the tenant continues to pay rent.43 Instead of extending the term

of the lease indefinitely, rent stabilization provides for an automatic renewal of the lease term.44 The tenant and the landlord sign
a new, written lease after each term of one or two years.45
The rent fixed by the rent stabilization code is somewhat closer

to market rent than rent control.46 The rents may be increased for
a specific list of reasons,47 including when there is a vacancy in the
housing accommodation 4 8 and, when landlords complete a build-

ing-wide major capital improvement. 9 In addition, once every two
years, 0 the landlord may obtain a rent increase if hardship is
shown. 1
42. The rent control code does provide some guidance. See generally id. at § 26405(9)(g)(1). For example, it states that adjustments shall be made where, "rental
income from a property yields a net annual return of less than [6%] of the valuation
of the property." Id. at § 26-405(9)(g)(1)(a).
43. Id. at § 26-408a.
44. RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 26-511c(4).
45. Id.
46. First, the initial legal regulated rent of a housing accommodation was the rent
reserved in the last effective lease or other rental agreement. Id. at § 26-512(b)(3).
But see id. at § 26-512(b)(1), (2); id. at § 26-512(e). Next, the tenant or the owner
may apply for an adjustment of this initial rent. See generally id. at § 26-513(a); id. at
§ 26-513(b)(1), (2). This is distinct from rent control, where the initial legal rent is
based on the original lease.
47. Id. at § 26-511(c).
48. See generally UPDATE - THE NEW RENT STABILIZATION CODE, supra note 28.
The rules are fairly specific as to when the rent may be increased, without a vacancy

of the tenant. See generally RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 26-511.
49. RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 26-511(c)(6)(b). The rent may only be increased, however, at a maximum rate of six percent per year. Id. at § 26-511(c)(6)(b).
50. Id. at § 26-530(b).
51. Id. at § 26-511c(6)(a). Because the Conciliation and Appeals Board reviews
hardship applications, there is very little case law concerning what constitutes a hardship. For more information, see generally Matter of Windsor Park Tenants' Assoc. v.
N.Y.C. Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 59 A.D.2d 121 (1977) (holding that the appellee
must conduct a meaningful review of any application for hardship by a landlord).
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The common goal of both rent control and rent stabilization is to

prevent an acute shortage of affordable dwellings. 51 Most economists, however, have argued that rent regulations of this kind exac-

erbate the very problem that they were intended to solve.53

Nevertheless, most mainstream politicians support the continuation of rent control and rent stabilization in New York City. 54 This
is, perhaps, a testament to the political power wielded by the rent
regulated tenants in New York.55
B.

FIRREA

In the 1980s, a crisis struck the savings and loan industry.
Reuters estimates that from the mid 1980s through the beginning
of 1993, the size of the bailout had already reached $145 billion,
56
with an additional $45 billion requested by President Clinton.
52. Id. at § 26-401(a); Id. at § 26-501. See supra note 11 and the accompanying
text.
53. The economists theorize that artificial price ceilings will reduce supply by reducing profitability for owners of buildings. In situations of marginal profitability,
there is little, if any, incentive to keep the rent regulated apartments well maintained.
See, e.g., Carol Rapaport, Rent Regulation and Housing-MarketDynamics, 82 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

and Tenant Subsidies, 27

446 (1992); John C. Moorhouse, Long-Term Rent Control
& BUSINESS 6 (1987).

QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS

For excellent international perspectives on the issue, see also Stephen Malpezzi, Can
New York and Los Angeles learn from Kumasi and Bangalore? Costs and benefits of
rent controls in developing countries, 4 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 589 (1993); THE
COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL URBAN LIAISON, RENT CONTROL IN NORTH
AMERICA AND FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1977); INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, VERDICT ON RENT CONTROL (1972).

54. Most New York politicians have come out in favor of rent regulations. In the
1992 New York City mayoral campaign, both the Republican candidate, Rudolph Giuliani, and the Democratic incumbent, David Dinkins, were in favor of continuing the
rent regulations. Ronald Brownstein, Whites Screaming At Blacks. Chasids Suing the
Mayor. Latinos Grumbling They've Been Ignored. And Two Flawed Candidates Navigating the Edges of the Maelstrom. It's a Helluva Mayor's Race, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1993 (Magazine) at 12. Newsday reported that Senator Al D'Amato has
reversed his views. His opinion appears to have changed from being against rent
control, to being in favor of it. Campaign '92 D'Amato's Record Sen. Pothole: The
Record, NEWSDAY, Oct. 4, 1992 (Nassau and Suffolk ed.) at 4. One of the few politicians that came out against rent regulations in New York was Vice President Dan
Quayle, who called it, "that enduring monument to economic illiteracy..." The Enduring Cost of Rent Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1992, § 1 (Editorial Desk), at 22.
55. See John Riley, Reluctant Warriors; Rent battle tests wimp factor in city's 6 Republican senators, NEWSDAY, June 27, 1993 (News) at 18; Rent Control Forever, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1985 (Editorial Desk) at 18. Interestingly, Massachusetts has begun
to phase out rent control. See Michael Kenney, The big winner; On the rent control
issue is Gov. Weld, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1995 (City Weekly) at 1; Rent Control
phase-out, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Jan. 8, 1995 (Editorial) at 8D.
56. Reuters, $45 Billion More Sought to Bail out Failed S & L's, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, March 17, 1993, at 2E. It is evident, however, that the numbers of failures
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Congress passed FIRREA in an effort to handle the current crisis
and to prevent another. FIRREA amended many provisions of
the banking laws, vastly increased the powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, created the RTC and its oversight
board,58 and abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and
the FSLIC.59
The RTC's function is to manage all failed banks and their assets, insured by the FSLIC between January 1, 1989 and August 9,
1992.60 The stated goals of the RTC are:
(i) to maximize the net present value return from the sale or
other disposition of institutions,
(ii) to minimize the impact of transactions on local real estate
and financial markets,
(iii) to make efficient use of funding,
(iv) to minimize losses, and,
(v) to maximize the availability and affordability of residential
real property for low and moderate-income individuals. 6 '
have, of late, reduced significantly. See Reuters, A Failure-Free1st Quarter Reported
for U.S. Banks, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 29, 1994, at Business, 9.
57. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 98.
58. The Oversight Board's function is to oversee and be accountable for the RTC.
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(a). The Oversight Board consists of five members; the Secretary of
the Treasury; the Chairman of the Federal Reserve; the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development; and two other members, appointed by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(3)(A).
59. For an overview of FIRREA, see, e.g., Annual Survey Issue, FinancialInstitutions and Regulations, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. S1 (1991); Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself.: Revising and
Reshaping The Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
1117 (1989); Paul W. Grace, An Overview of the FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, C456 ALI-ABA 235 (1989).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(A). In addition, the RTC's duties include management of the Federal Asset Disposition Association. 12 U.S.C. § 1421(b)(3)(B). FIRREA also states that within 180 days of FIRREA's enactment, the RTC must
liquidate the Federal Asset Disposition Association. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(f). The RTC
has many additional powers, including: the power to adopt, alter, and use a corporate
seal, enter into contracts, to make payments, "to acquire, hold, lease, mortgage, maintain, or dispose of... real and personal property... and... exercise all the usual
incidents of ownership," to sue and to be sued, to deposit any securities or funds, "to
take warrants, voting and nonvoting equity, or other participation interests in institutions or assets," to prescribe bylaws, to make loans, to issue capital certificates, and to
prepare and provide such reports as required by FIRREA. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(10).
In order to carry out its functions, the RTC may also create new depository institutions, or merge or consolidate two or more existing depository institutions. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b)(11)(A)(iv).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i) - (v).
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In an important grant of power, FIRREA states that no court may
restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the RTC as
a conservator or a receiver.62
At issue in the Diamond case is 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1). This
provision grants the RTC the power, as conservator or receiver, to:
disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease (A) to which such
institution is a party; (B) the performance of which the conservator or receiver, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion,
determines to be burdensome; and (C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the conservator or receiver determines...
will promote the orderly administration of the institution's
affairs.63
RTC v. Diamond64
In the summer of 1987, the title to nine apartments at 444 East
57th Street passed to Nassau Federal Savings & Loan, as collateral
on a defaulted loan.65 The RTC was appointed as conservator of
this savings and loan ("S & L"). Unfortunately, this S & L failed.'
On becoming receiver, the RTC proceeded to reorganize the NFSL
as a new institution called Nassau Savings and Loan Association,
F.A. ("Nassau S & L").6 7 On November 16, 1990, the RTC closed
Nassau S & L, became receiver of Nassau S & L, and began to
liquidate its assets pursuant to FIRREA.68
Shortly after the RTC had become conservator of NFSL, the
RTC sent a letter to the tenants of the nine apartments, repudiatC.

'62. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)(Supp. 1993). This broad grant of power will have great
significance on the issue of courts' deference to the RTC. See supra part III.A(ii).
Another grant of power allows the RTC to sue directors or officers of an insured
depository institution and hold them personally liable for monetary damages. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k). See also Douglas V. Austin and Sidney M. Weinstein, Bank Officer
and Director Liability Under FIRREA: The Need for a National Standard of Gross
Negligence, 111 BANKING L.J. 67 (1994).
63. See generally Gregory J. Pulles, Defining the Boundariesof the FDIC's Repudiation Authority Under FIRREA, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 17 (1992); Eric William Hess,
Note, Federal Preemption of Rent Regulation Under FIRREA, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
939 (1993).
64. 801 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, Diamond 1, 18 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
1994), vacated, remanded sub nom., Solomon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 115 S. Ct. 43
(1994), vacated, remanded sub nom., Pattullo v. Resolution Trust Corp., 115 S. Ct. 44
(1994), and on recons., reinstated, in part, modified, remanded, Diamond II, 45 F.3d
665 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Solomon v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995), and cert.
denied, Pattullo v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995).
65. Diamond I, 18 F.3d at 115.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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ing their leases.69 The RTC sent a second repudiation letter after
becoming receiver for Nassau S & L.7° In each letter, the RTC
notified the tenants that they could either, "(a) treat[ ] the tenancy
as terminated, (b) remain[ I in possession for the balance of the
lease-term, or (c) purchase[ ] the unit on stated terms. ' ' 71 Instead,
the tenants chose to file a complaint with the New York Division of
Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR). 72 The Attorney General of New York, on behalf of the tenants and the State of New
York, protested that the RTC had exceeded its authority.73 In response to that protest and to alleviate other concerns,74 the RTC
issued a policy statement that indicated that it would not repudiate
rent regulated leases of low and moderate-income tenants.
On February 25, 1991, the RTC filed a complaint in district
court, seeking to evict the tenants, none of whom were of low or
moderate-income.76 The defendants argued that, under state law,
the tenancies were not leases, -but were "statutory tenancies."
Thus, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1), which allows the RTC to disaffirm
"any contract or lease," did not encompass the tenancies.77 In its
cross motion, the RTC argued that FIRREA preempted the state
rent regulations, granting the RTC the' power to repudiate the
leases.78
On August 21, 1992, the court granted summary judgment for
the tenants. 79 District Court Judge Carter divided the federal preemption issue into two questions,
1) whether the tenants in this case have occupancy rights by virtue of leases or instead pursuant to statutory tenancies independent of any leases; and
69. Id.
70. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 115.

71. Id. at 116.
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. This includes its goal to maximize the availability and affordability of resident
real

property

for

low

and

moderate-income

individuals.

12

U.S.C.

§ 1441a(b)(3)(C)(v).
75. Diamond I, 18 F.3d at 116 (quoting RTC Statement of Policy for the Disposi-

tion of Residential Units Which Were Previously Subject to Rent or Securities Regulations (February 22, 1991)).
76. The complaint named the nine tenants, the commissioner of the DHCR, and
the Attorney General of the State of New York as defendants. DiamondI, 18 F.3d at
116.
77. Id. at 116 - 117.
78. Id. at 117.
79. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1164.
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2) if these rights derive from statutory tenancies, whether the

"any contract or lease" language of section 1821(e)(1) empow-

ers the RTC to repudiate statutory tenancies as well as the more
80
traditional landlord-tenant relationship embodied in a lease.

The district court held that New York law, "makes clear that the
tenants it covers enjoy a protection from eviction that is independ' 81
ent of any lease that may exist between landlord and tenant."
The district court concluded that the rent regulations create statutory tenancies, which are separate and distinct from common law
leases. 82
The court then considered whether § 1821(e)(1) gives the RTC
the power to disaffirm 'statutory tenancies'. First, the court dismissed the argument that, under the broad grant of interpretive
powers of § 1821(j), 83 the RTC deserved considerable deference
for its interpretation of FIRREA. 4 Next, the court analyzed the
five goals of the RTC enumerated in § 1441(b)(3)(C) and held that
interpreting § 1821(e)(1) as not including the 'statutory tenancies'
would be consistent with those goals.85 Finally, the court held that
80. Id. at 1157.
81. Id. at 1157. The district court cited only two cases to support this interpretation of New York Law. See Friarton Estates Corp. v. City of New York (In re Friarton
Estates Corp.), 65 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that application of rent
control to debtor was not an unconstitutional taking and that the Bankruptcy Code
did not entitle debtor to reject leases); W.T. Assocs. v. Huston, 472 N.Y.S.2d 562
(Sup. Ct. 1984) (granted, in a fact intensive decision, a preliminary injunction to the
defendants, where plaintiffs, landlords of an apartment building undergoing cooperative conversion, sought to enter to improve apartments). It did not attempt to explain
how a lease "may exist" between the landlord and the tenant and yet not be "any
lease or contract" as used by § 1821(e)(1).
82. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1159.
83. The district court cited Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
courts, when applying § 1821(j), should consider whether the RTC's "powers or functions" under FIRREA would be restrained or affected by a district court decision).
For a more detailed discussion, see supra part III.A.(ii).
84. Agencies are typically granted deference, especially when interpreting their
own governing statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation interpreting the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments).
For a more detailed discussion, see supra part III.A.(ii).
85. The goals are discussed supra, at note 61, and the accompanying text. The
court's holding in this section relies on subdivisions (ii) and (v), which state that the
RTC should, "(ii) minimize[ ] the impact of such transactions on local real estate and
financial markets ...(v) maximize[ ] the preservation of the availability and affordability of residential real property for low and moderate-income individuals." Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1161. The court seemed to ignore that elimination of rent
control would restore the real estate and financial markets to their unaffected state.
In addition, the court dismissed the impact of the RTC's policy statement where the
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FIRREA did not preempt the city rent regulations 86 and that the
rent regulations did not conflict with the ability of the RTC to carry
out the goals and provisions of FIRREA. 87 The court stated that,
[w]hile the RTC's inability to evict rent-regulated tenants may
indeed hinder its resolution efforts, such hindrance derives not
from restrictions state laws place on the powers of the RTC, but
rather from the fact that Congress did not give the RTC the
power to repudiate statutory tenancies in the first place.88
The district court reasoned that since the rent regulations created
statutory tenancies and that such tenancies are outside the powers
of the RTC, FIRREA does not preempt the rent regulations. 89
In March 1994, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court decision, holding that the RTC does
have the power to disaffirm the rent regulated leases ("Diamond
P'). 90 After analyzing the rent regulations, the court held that each
rent regulated lease is defined and governed by contract. 91 The
court, at some length, showed how the provisions of the original
leases carried over into the renewal periods, with the exception of
rent and duration. 9z The Second Circuit, therefore, held that the
rent regulations did not create "statutory tenancies" independent
of leases; rather, rent regulations merely affected existing leases.93
Thus, under FIRREA, the RTC has the power to repudiate the
leases. 94
To ascertain Congress's intent, the court compared FIRREA to
the Bankruptcy Code from which § 1821(e)(1) was adopted. 95 The
Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to reject an unexpired lease or
executory contract of a debtor.96 The Bankruptcy Code provides
that the tenant may retain the leasehold, including any renewal or
extension that is "enforceable under nonbankruptcy law."' 97 Thus,
RTC stated that it would not disaffirm the leases of low or moderate-income tenants.
Id. Thus, the court's conclusion in this section is somewhat strained.
86. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1161.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 126.
91. Id.
92. Id. For a more indepth discussion of this issue, see supra notes 143 to 147 and
the accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., id. at 122; Unisys Finance Corp. v. RTC, 979 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1992).

96. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).

97. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 122. This provision has been amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465 (codified as amended in scattered
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under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee cannot disaffirm rent regulated leases, but the tenant can stay for all renewals and extensions. 98 According to the Second Circuit, the absence of this
provision from FIRREA indicates Congress's intent to grant the
RTC greater powers than those given to a trustee in bankruptcy. 99
The court concluded that because the rent regulations simply define and govern contracts, the RTC is empowered to disaffirm the
rent regulated leases. 1' °
In addition, the Second Circuit interpreted FIRREA's provision
allowing tenants to stay for the balance of the term of the lease.
The tenants argued that the terms of the rent regulated leases are
perpetual, because rent stabilized leases are automatically renewable and the terms of the rent controlled leases last as long as the
lessees continue to pay. 101 The court, however, responded that
§ 1821(e)(1) allows the tenant to stay only for the balance of the
term and not for any renewal period. 10 2 Thus, the Second Circuit
held that the tenant may stay for the balance of the lease term for
rent stabilized leases. 10 3 In addition, the Second Circuit held that
the balance of the term of a rent controlled lease ends on the biennial date on which the landlord can apply for a new increase in
rent.' o4
D.

O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC

On October 3, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded and vacated the Diamond I decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit based on its recent decision in O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC,0 5 which discussed the creation of federal common law
sections of 11 U.S.C.). The changes, however, do not affect the analysis in this Note
because the Bankruptcy Code in effect in 1989 was what Congress considered when
drafting FIRREA.
98. See, e.g., In re Ali Yasin, 179 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Friarton
Estates Corp., 65 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
99. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 122. This Note discusses this point, at length, infra part
IV.
100. Id. For a more in depth discussion, see infra part III.A.(i).
101. Id.
.102. Id. at 123. For a more in depth discussion, see infra part IV.
103. Recall that the landlord and the tenant sign renewal leases every one or two
years. See RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 26-511c(4).
104. Id. at 124.
105. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994). O'Melveny was one of the first Supreme Court decisions to discuss the application of federal common law in FIRREA. The Supreme
Court issued its decision three months after the Second Circuit issued its decision in
Diamond I.
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under FIRREA.'0 6 The question in O'Melveny was whether the
knowledge of corporate wrongdoing can be imputed to the FDIC
when it sues as receiver of the corporation. 10 7 The precise issue
before the Supreme Court was whether that question should be
resolved by federal or state common law. 10 8 Justice Scalia, writing

for a unanimous Court, held that state law governed the resolution
of the question, 10 9 ruling that the FDIC is "place[d] in the shoes of
the insolvent S & L" in order to try its claims under state law,
except when some specific provision in FIRREA provides
otherwise. 110
The Court placed much significance on the fact that FIRREA
explicitly created special federal rules of decision regarding claims
and defenses in suits involving the FDIC as receiver."' The Court
noted that when Congress enacts statutes in a specific area, it is

inappropriate for courts to supplement the statutory law with federal common law where Congress has omitted the details." 2 Any
details left out are normally resolved under state law. 113 FIRREA,
106. Solomon v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 43 (1994); Pattullo v. RTC, 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994).
107. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2052.
108. Id. The doctrine of federal preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution which states that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land
... [the] laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. For much of the history of this country, constitutional jurisprudence held that this
clause meant that there was a federal common law that was independent of the states'
common law. In 1938, the Supreme Court ended this line of jurisprudence by holding,
"[t]here is no federal general common law." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78

(1938).
109. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2052. But see, Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that federal common law governs issues concerning priority, ownership
and adjustment of claims by stockholders against an insolvent bank after takeover by
FDIC).
110. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2054. Notwithstanding that decision, there are cases
in which federal common law can be said to apply to a narrow range of issues. See
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Kimbell Foods set up a
three part test to determine whether a federal court should apply a state law in the
absence of a congressional enactment. Courts should consider, "[1] the need for a
uniform body of federal law, [2] the likelihood that the disparate application of state
laws would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program, and [3] the extent to
which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law." Conille v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 840 F.2d 105,
112 n.11 (1st Cir. 1988).
111. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
112. This would seem to create a problem for the Second Circuit in Diamond L As
is discussed below, however, O'Melveny applies to what area of law should be applied
in the absence of statutory federal law. In the Diamond case, however, the issue is
how to construe a specific federal grant of power. See infra, Part III A.
113. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2054. See, e.g., Karahalios v. National Federation of
Federal Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 529 (1989) (holding Title VII of the
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according to the Court, is a part of a broad scheme of banking regulations. 1 4 If, however, there is a significant federal interest which

is in conflict with a state interest, then the federal interest may pre-

vail." 5 The Court held, however, that the only identifiable interest
at stake was uniformity of the law." 16 Should the Court have found

that interest as sufficient,
the courts would be "awash in 'federal
117
rules."
common-law'
E.

Resolution Trust Corporation v. Diamond ("Diamond IF')
Although much of the opinion in Diamond I discussed the defi-

nition of "contract or lease" contained within 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(1), 118 the Supreme Court in O'Melveny held that details
left out of a comprehensive federal scheme are presumed to be
decided according to state law. 1 9 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 20 one of the cases

cited in O'Melveny to support the presumption of state law application, distinguished a court's authority to create a new rule or pro-

vide a new remedy from a court's authority to construe a statute.
On remand, the Second Circuit in Diamond II, however, interpreted this part of the O'Melveny decision narrowly, writing, "[o]ur

reading of the cases cited by the Court following this [holding],
demonstrates to us that the Court had in mind court-created reme-

dies and causes of action, not definitions of terms used in a federal
statute."'' Thus, the Second Circuit ruled that its holding in Diamond I was correct in using federal common law to interpret the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 does not imply a private cause of action for federal
employees); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (which did not
imply a cause of action for punitive damages for a violation of ERISA); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (holding that Northwest
Airlines has no federal common law right of contribution from the Union for violations of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act).
114. O'Melveny, 114 S.Ct. at 2054.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2055.
117. Id.
118. Diamond 11, 45 F.3d 665, 671 (2d Cir. 1995).
119. O'Melveny, 114 S.Ct. at 2054.
120. 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (holding that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the Equal Pay Act did not contain an implied right of contribution).
121. Diamond HI, 45 F.3d at 671. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301,
305 (1992) (holding that federal law governed the meaning of 'punitive damages' as
used in 28 U.S.C. § 2674); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 431 (1986)
(which held that federal law governed the meaning of 'debt' within the Bankruptcy
Code). See also 1A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACtICE 0.324
(2d ed. 1994).
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words of a federal statute. 22 As discussed above, Diamond I used
federal preemption and statutory construction to determine that
the RTC can disaffirm the rent regulated leases. The Diamond II
court stated, "[o]ur decision in Diamond [I] does not (and did not
purport to) write federal common law; we did not create a new
remedy, cause of action, or rule of decision. "123
Thus, the Court' of Appeals for the Second Circuit substantially
reinstated its original opinion in Diamond 1,124 slightly modifying
the balance of the term of a rent controlled lease. 125 The decision
in Diamond II modified Diamond rs holding that the term of a
rent controlled lease ends on the date the landlord can apply for a
new increase in rent. 126 While Diamond I sought to find the closest
analogy to a lease term for rent controlled leases,' 27 Diamond H
altered the holding in Diamond I to bring it in line with new legislation, 28 which, recently enacted by the New York State Legislature, decontrols apartments for wealthy tenants. 29 Ostensibly, the
court in Diamond II worried that under Diamond 's holding, it
was possible for the RTC to repudiate a rent controlled lease leaving the tenant with only a few days left before the expiration of the
lease term. 130 Thus, the court in Diamond II held that the balance
of the term of a rent controlled lease lasts until the first day of June
13
in the year after the repudiation by the RTC. 1

122. Diamond II, 45 F.3d at 671. The court further held, "[it is a 'settled principle
of statutory construction that absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt
the common law definition of statutory terms.' " Id. (quoting United States v.
Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382, 384 (1994) (citing, Molzof, 502 U.S. at 305-07 (1992))).
123. Diamond H, 45 F.3d at 671. For a more thorough discussion of the holding in
Diamond I, see supra notes 90 to 103 and the accompanying text.
124. 18 F.3d 111 (1994).
125. Diamond II, 45 F.3d 665 (2d Cir. 1995).
126. Diamond 1, 18 F.3d at 124.
127. 45 F.3d at 676.
128. Id. at 677.
129. It decontrols leases where the monthly rent exceeds $2,000 and the annual
family income of the tenant exceeds $250,000 for the two preceding calendar years.

1993 Sess. Law News of N.Y., 216th Legislature, Ch. 253 (McKinney's 1993).
130. Diamond II, 45 F.3d at 676. The court seemed unconcerned that it is still pos-

sible for rent stabilized tenants to have their leases disaffirmed a few days before the
end of the term.

131. Id. at 677.
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Il. The RTC's Repudiation Authority Under § 1821(e)(1)

Federal law preempts state or local law in three ways: express
preemption, where Congress specifically preempts state law; 132 implied preemption, where a federal scheme so "thoroughly occupies
a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it' ,,;133 and conflict
it is impossible to follow both the federal and
preemption, where
34
the state laws.'

Clearly, with respect to FIRREA and the New York City rent
regulations, there are no grounds for implied preemption. While

one could argue that Congress intended FIRREA to take up the

whole field of banking law, 35 there is no evidence that Congress
intended to preempt all of New York's housing regulations. Thus,

the question of preemption of the rent regulations by § 1821(e)(1)
36
confines itself to express and conflict preemption analysis.
The argument for express preemption centers on the principles

of statutory construction. Under this analysis, the question is how
broad to interpret the "any contract or lease" language of FIRREA. It is only necessary to determine if that language is sufficient to encompass rent regulated leases. If so, the RTC has the
power to repudiate such leases. Alternatively, the argument for

conflict preemption is that there is a direct confrontation between
132. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557 58 (1990) (holding that federal law governs the meaning of "debts" in the Bankruptcy
context); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (holding that federal
law governs the meaning of the word "deposit" as applied to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act).
133. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (quoting Fidelity Fed.
Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230)). See also, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
Company, 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (holding that state regulation of natural gas companies interfered with Congress' "intent to occupy [the] given field to the exclusion of
state law.").
134. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that state law is
preempted where it stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."); FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d
1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (which held that state law prohibiting assignment of letters of
credit was preempted as applied to an assignment from the FDIC as receiver of a
failed bank to the FDIC in its corporate capacity).
135. For a more thorough discussion of the issue of whether FIRREA takes up the
whole field of banking law, see infra notes 160 to 164 and the accompanying text.
136. The Second Circuit in Diamond II used similar reasoning when they ruled,
"where there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict, the state law must yield .... We
therefore hold that, to the extent that the anti-eviction provisions of New York's rent
regulations interfere with the operation of § 1821(e), the state regulations and laws
are preempted by FIRREA." Diamond II, 45 F.3d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1995).
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FIRREA, which allows the RTC to repudiate the leases, 37 and the
rent regulations, which allow the tenant to maintain the leasehold
for as long as the tenant pays rent. 138 Under conflict preemption
analysis, this conflict must be resolved in favor of the federal law.
Thus, when considering the question of whether § 1821(e)(1) permits the disaffirmance of rent regulated leases, there are two alternative analyses that one can pursue: express preemption or conflict
preemption. Each of these are considered below.
A.

Express Preemption

(1) Statutory Construction
The plain meaning of § 1821(e)(1) indicates Congressional intent
to empower the RTC to disaffirm leases. 3 9 What is unclear is
whether or not the "any contract or lease" language in § 1821(e)(1)
includes rent regulated leases. Assuming that Congress intended
the RTC to be able to disaffirm rent regulated leases, the question
that arises is what language Congress could have used to be
clearer. Both the district court decision in Diamond and the Appellee's brief for the Second Circuit in Diamond I, however, fail to
suggest what sufficient other language Congress could have used.
One possible suggestion is to adopt the language of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(k)(1)(A)(i), which allows the RTC to merge or consolidate
banking institutions upon a determination of severe financial conditions that threaten the stability of those institutions, "notwithstanding any provision of state law.' 140 Congress uses this
language because it wants the RTC to merge banking institutions,
unfettered by state law. If Congress had used similar language in
§ 1821(e)(1), however, any state law that would have governed any
aspect of the repudiation process would be preempted, not merely
the rent regulations. Clearly, Congress's objective in § 1821(e)(1)
was not to preempt all state laws involved. Rather, the language
used in § 1821(e)(1)
seems tailored to preempt laws similar to the
14 1
rent regulations.
137. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1).
138. RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-408a; RENT STABILIZATION CODE § 26-511c(4).
139. In interpreting statutes, courts must first analyze a statute's plain meaning.
BFP v. RTC, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
See generally SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 45.11 (5th ed. 1992).
140. Appellee's Brief at 26, Diamond I (No. 92-6244).
141. A contrary result would seem to allow states to preempt the RTC. If "any
contract or lease" does not include rent regulated leases, then a state would only have
to pass legislation that prevented the eviction of any tenant, commercial or residen-
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The district court held, however, that notwithstanding the extent
of the power of the RTC, the rent regulations create "statutory tenancies" which are "independent of any lease [the tenants] may
have with their landlords, in this case the RTC."' 142 This ruling is
contrary to New York law, which draws little distinction between
statutory and non-statutory tenancies. New York courts have held
that rent regulations are not entirely independent of the leases
originally signed between the landlords and the tenants. For example, in 130 West 57th Corp. v. Hyman, 43 the court held that "it
would be carrying the protection afforded a tenant to an unfair degree to hold that the obligations of the tenancy incorporated in the
1
lease do not govern the relationship of landlord and tenant."'"
Similarly, in Hudson View Propertiesv. Weiss,145 the court held that
the provisions of a lease that are not in conflict with the rent regulations "are projected into the statutory tenancy, and will continue
in effect during the term of the statutory tenancy."'1 6 Thus, all of
the terms of the original lease continue to function while the tenant
is in possession. Only the rent and duration are controlled by
147
statute.
(2) Deference to RTC
The rent regulations merely modify leases and do not replace
them. Since rent regulated tenants do, in fact, have leases, the
RTC has interpreted its power to repudiate "any Contract or lease"
under § 1821(e)(1) to include those leases. 48 The RTC interpretation is important because a federal agency's interpretation of legistial, to prevent the RTC from repudiating tenants. Many other similar laws are possible. Clearly, this absurd result was not the intent of Congress.
142. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1160.
143. 66 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. App. Term. 1946).
144. Id. at 334.
145. 442 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. App. Term. 1981).
146. Id. at 370, (quoting Rasch, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2d ed.,
§ 286) (other citation omitted).
147. One of the principal cases involving rent control is Stern v. Equitable Trust Co.
of New York, 144 N.E. 578 (N.Y. 1924). In that case, the New York Court of Appeals
held that the relationship of landlord and tenant in a rent regulated environment is
lease based. The court remarked, "[tihe primary, but not the only, purpose of the
Emergency Rent Laws was to prevent the wholesale eviction of tenants who were
willing to pay a reasonable rent but who could not agree with their landlords as to the
amount to be paid." Stern, 144 N.E. at 578. Thus, even 70 years ago, the Court of
Appeals acknowledged that rent control regulates the rent and the landlord's ability
to evict. It does not create tenancies independent of leases.
148. RTC Statement of Policy for the Disposition of Residential Units Which Were
Previously Subject to Rent or Securities Regulations (February 22, 1991).
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lation, particularly the governing statute, must be given deference

by courts. 14 9

FIRREA itself provides for significant deference to the RTC's
discretion in § 18210)150 and § 1821(d)(13)(D).' 5 ' In Rosa v. RTC,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that these

sections allow the RTC to function as conservator or receiver

"without judicial interference that would restrain or affect the exercise of its powers. 1 152 Additionally, in Morton v. Arlington Heights
Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., a district court held that "Conshort any judicial inquiry into the propriety of
gress intended to1' cut
53
the repudiation.'
The Second Circuit in 1185 Avenue of the Americas Assocs. v.

RTC held that because more than one agency administers FIRREA, courts should not give deference to the RTC's interpretation. 154 Instead, the court applied whichever interpretation of the
parties to the litigation was most reasonable. 5 5 To use a standard

149. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation interpreting
the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments), the Supreme Court
set up a two-part test to determine how much deference agencies will receive from
courts for all agency interpretations of statutes. First, the court must determine if the
intent of Congress is clear. Id. at 842. If the intent is clear, then the analysis need go
no further. id. Second, if the intent is not clear, then the issue becomes whether the
agency's interpretation is "a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. Thus,
if the RTC's interpretation is reasonable, then courts must defer to that interpretation. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law
Treatise (3d ed. 1994).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)(Supp. 1993) reads, in its relevant part, "[e]xcept as provided in this section, no court may take any action, except at the request of the Board
of Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or
functions of the Corporation as a conservator or a receiver."
151. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) reads, in its relevant part, "no court shall have
jurisdiction over (i) any claim or action... seeking determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been
appointed receiver ... . or (ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the Corporation as receiver."
152. 938 F.2d 383, 397 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that provisions of an injunction
prohibiting banks in receivership from attempting to terminate Employee Retirement
Income Security Act pension plan was an invalid encroachment on the RTC's exercise
of statutory power). See also Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d
703 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that FIRREA deprived a federal court of jurisdiction to
enjoin the FDIC from foreclosing upon a certificate of deposit); Bender v. Centrust
Mortgage Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1525 (S.D. Fl. 1992) (holding that courts could not impose a constructive trust on assets of subsidiary so as to prevent its liquidation by the
RTC).
153. 836 F. Supp. 477, 485 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
154. 22 F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that any repudiation by the RTC must
be within a reasonable period of time following its appointment as receiver).
155. Id. at 497.
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that applies the most reasonable interpretation would seem to be,

in reality, equivalent to granting no deference at all. 156 Given that
two agencies do interpret FIRREA, perhaps the RTC's interpretation does not deserve
full deference. 157 Some deference, however,
58
should be granted.

156. The cases which the Second Circuit cited to support this position do not actually use or suggest that standard. In Lieberman v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 771 F.2d 32
(2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the Clayton Act prohibited the Federal Trade Commission from confidentially informing state attorneys general of premerger information),
the court held that when more than one agency administers a statute, "a reviewing
court does not.., owe as much deference," as it might otherwise. Id. at 37 (emphasis
added). In fact, in dicta, the court stated that it was not suggesting that Congress
could not delegate dual lawmaking authority. Id. at 37 n.11. Certainly, if two agencies which have the power to interpret a statute interpret the statute differently, the
court is right in deciding to grant either agency no deference. Id. But, Lieberman
does not support the proposition that absent such contrary interpretations, no deference should be granted to such agencies. It holds that such agencies deserve merely
less deference than with only one agency. Id.
The other case cited by 1185 Avenue of the Americas Assocs. is Wachtel v. Office of
Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that, based on a condition
imposed on a holding company that the net worth of a savings bank be maintained,
the Office of Thrift Supervision could not make a mandatory claim against the holding company without a showing of either reckless disregard of legal responsibilities or
unjust enrichment). In that case, the*Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that it would not defer to the Office of Thrift Supervision's interpretation because it ruled the statute unambiguous. Id. at 585. According to Chevron, a court
must first find a statute ambiguous, before it reaches the issue of deference to an
agency. See supra note 148, and the accompanying text. Because the statute was
unambiguous, the analysis never needed to proceed beyond Chevron's first step. The
second step - the question of whether the interpretation is a permissible one - was not
a part of the holding. Thus, neither of the cases the Second Circuit cited in 1185
Avenue of the Americas Assocs. support its conclusion that it should grant the RTC no
deference.
157. 1185 Avenue of the Americas Assocs. also held that whether a disaffirmed lease
is burdensome, should be decided at the discretion of the RTC, when it is a conservator or receiver. 22 F.3d at 498. See, e.g., Atlantic Mechanical, Inc. v. RTC, 772 F.
Supp. 288 (E.D. Va. 1991); Morton, 836 F. Supp. at 484. The appellees in the Diamond case, however, attempted to argue that the rent regulated leases were not "burdensome," as is required by § 1821(e)(1)(b). Appellee's Brief at 40, Diamond (No.
92-6244). The Appellees contention is that the "net present value return from the
sale or other disposition of its assets" somehow includes the reduced value of the
apartments due to their rent regulated nature.
See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i)(Supp. 1993). This argument is nonsensical. Even the Appellees
admit that the units are undervalued. Appellee's Brief at 41. Furthermore, if the
RTC can disaffirm the leases, then the property must be valued with that option in
mind.
158. The FDIC has not, as of yet, issued a policy on this point. The question of
where to draw the line is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
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Conflict Preemption

Unfortunately, other than the Diamond cases, few cases address
FIRREA's conflict preemption of rent regulations. 5 9 There are
several related cases, however, that are illuminating. Patterson v.
FDIC,involves FIRREA's repudiation of property interests other
than leases. 160 In that case, the Western Bank of El Paso, Texas
6
foreclosed on several properties secured by deed of trust liens.' '
After the Bank failed and the FDIC took over as receiver, the
plaintiff sought "a declaratory judgment invalidating the deed of
trust under Texas law because it encumbered her homestead."' 162
The FDIC claimed that the Texas law was preempted by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e), which states that agreements are not valid when they
"tend to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] .... 163
Concerned with the meaning of "agreement" in § 1823(e), the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the reach of
§ 1823(e) was not so broad as to "override the Texas homestead
laws, including its constitution."' 164 Patterson thus provides a good
example of a court's reluctance to preempt an entire area of state
law through conflict preemption analysis.
There are a number of cases that involve the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's ("HUD") preemption of local
laws. In Burroughs v. Hills, 65 the district court held that local
housing regulations applied to property owned by HUD, demonstrating a reluctance to allow HUD to preempt an entire area of
state law. This case concerned properties that, when foreclosed by
HUD, were in a state of severe disrepair. The issue was whether
the local housing codes applied to any repairs conducted by
159. One notable exception is RTC v. City of Boston, 150 F.R.D. 449 (D. Mass.
1993). Similar to Diamond,the RTC sought a declaration that the rent control ordinance did not apply to the RTC's operations in Boston. This decision in this case,
however, involved the right of the Commonwealth, tenants rights groups and a tenant
to intervene. The issue of the legality of the RTC's position has yet to be resolved.
160. 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990).
161. Id.'at 541.
162. Id. at 542.
163. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. 1993), which reads, in its relevant part, "[n]o agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in any asset... shall
" This provision includes a lengthy exception which is
be valid against the [FDIC] ....

beyond the scope of this Note.
164. The homestead laws are also protected, in part, by the Texas Constitution. See
Patterson, 918 F.2d at 545.
165. 564 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. IlM. 1983).
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HUD."6 HUD argued that the housing codes did not apply to repairs it conducted because HUD is a federal department and imposing the local housing codes on HUD would cost it significantly
more money. 167 The court rejected this argument holding that preemption based solely on HUD's federal status would allow any
federal entity to preempt any state law, whenever it wanted. 168 In
rejecting the "it would cost more money" theory, the court ruled
that this argument could also lead to significant abuse, as it could
be used to avoid liability anytime that local law requires some expenditure of federal funds. 69
Despite Burroughs, there are many cases where HUD has preempted local housing laws. In each of these cases, however, federal law preempted specific laws rather than the states' entire
housing laws. In Conille v. Secretary of HUD,17 ° the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, relying on United States v. Kimbell
Foods,'71 preempted a Massachusetts local law that required a
higher level of maintenance than federal law for HUD-owned
properties, stating, "certain [Clongressional purposes underlying
the [National Housing Act] would be frustrated if we [did not preempt].' 72 Likewise, in Ayers v. PhiladelphiaHousing Auth., the
Third Circuit held that HUD regulations preempted Pennsylvania
eviction procedures when it found that application of the state law
1 74
would frustrate many of the objectives of the housing program.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has rendered two decisions involving HUD's preemption of Boston's rent control laws.
In Kargman v. Sullivan,'175 the landlords of federally-subsidized low
and middle-income housing projects were subject to both federal
and local laws regulating the permissible rents. The landlords of
these HUD-subsidized properties brought suit asking the court to
hold that federal law preempted state law.' 76 At the time of the
suit, HUD had not taken a position on the applicability of the local
166. Id. at 1018. The court rejected an express preemption argument, ruling that
HUD's own guidelines supported the defendants' position on the preemption issue.
Id. at 1019.
167. Id. at 1019.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 840 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
171. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). See also supra note 110.
172. Conille, 840 F.2d at 112.
173. 908 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1990).
174. Id. at 1192; cf Rowe v. Pierce, 622 F. Supp. 1030 (D.D.C. 1985).
175. 552 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1977).
176. Id. at 6.
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rent controls on HUD-subsidized, privately-owned properties. 177
The First Circuit held that the mere potential for conflict was not
enough to justify the conclusion that federal power preempts an
1 78
otherwise valid exercise of state sovereignty.
Three years later, however, the Secretary of HUD promulgated
1 79
a regulation that specifically preempted all local rent controls.
Distinguishing Kargman,8 ° the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in City of Boston v. Harris,'8 1 held that
[t]hat case, unlike this one, presented no actual conflict between
the operation of HUD's subsidized insured housing programs
and Boston's rent control for the regulations [of HUD] ...were
not then in effect .... [T]hat case turned upon ... evidence

presented at a time when the Secretary's own policies were unclear and, indeed, had vacillated.' 82
Thus, the First Circuit allowed HUD to issue a regulation that preempted all state and local rent control laws based on the conflict
between HUD's regulation and the state's laws. 8 3 The court
wrote, "the fact that Congress itself did not foreclose local rent
control does not indicate it intended to preclude [a federal agency]
from so doing."' 184 The Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York, adopting the reasoning in Harris,have also held that HUD's
decision to preempt local rent control laws is discretionary, and not
85
subject to judicial review.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 13.
179. 40 Fed. Reg. 8189 (1975).
180. See supra notes 175 to 179 and the accompanying text.
181. 619 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1980).
182. Id. at 94.
183. The court cited the authority vested in HUD by 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d), which,
"gives the Secretary broad powers under the NHA to 'make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out [her] functions, powers, and duties." Id. See
also New York v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (holding that a Federal agency may preempt state or local laws that are otherwise not
inconsistent with federal law).
184. Harris,619 F.2d at 95.
185. Pumphrey v. Pierce, June 29, 1984 WL 588, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1984); Gramercy Spire Tenants' Ass'n v. Harris, 490 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Argo
v. Hills, 425 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). There are several other related cases,
involving other federal entities. See Bronstein v. Philadelpia Fair Housing Comm'n,
488 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that a HUD regulation preempted the
Federal Housing Commission's attempt to stop HUD approved rent increase); Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. Cowles, 403 F. Supp. 1337 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding
that the National Housing Act did not prempt the District of Columbia's rent control
statute).
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As indicated by both Pattersonand Burroughs,when considering

conflict preemption, courts are much more likely to hold that federal law preempts specific local laws than a whole area of law. In
Patterson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
§ 1823(e) did not preempt Texas laws protecting homesteads from
forced sales. The Texas Constitution provides, "[t]he homestead
shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof, or a part
of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and
* .'.

material used in constructing improvements thereon."' 86 Thus,
Federal law did not preempt Texas law where the state law gave

Patterson a homestead right that "'exists independent of any
agreement between the parties.' "187
The rent regulations, unlike the state laws in Patterson, are
clearly not a whole area of law. 188 New York State has several significant statutes designed to alleviate the problems of substandard
housing, in addition to the rent regulations. 189 They allow: the tenant to claim a warrantee of habitability, 190 rent to be withheld by
the welfare authorities, 191 rent to be abated during continuing "rent
impairing" violations, 192 and the offending building to be vacated. 193 The rent regulations are a small part of a larger
scheme, 194 which New York designed to alleviate the shortage of
well-maintained housing. Conversely, the Texas law in Patterson is
a part of the State Constitution, which protects a homestead from
practically any forced sale, save those that are related to tax payments, or purchasing or improving the homestead. Similarly, Bur186. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
187. Patterson, 918 F.2d at 543 (quoting In re Howard, 65 B.R. 498, 503 (W.D. Tex.
1986) (citing FDIC Corp. v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, 766 F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir.
1985))). See also American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees v.
FDIC, 826 F. Supp. 1448 (D.D.C. 1992).
188. See generally id.; City of Boston v. Harris,619 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1980); Joseph
Rasch, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT (3d ed. 1988).
189. Other significant New York State Laws governing rents, include laws concerning: when rent due on life leases is recoverable, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 221 (McKinney 1989); when rent is apportionable, id. § 222; effect of acceptance of rent from a
holdover tenant, id. § 232-c; tenant's right to offset rent payments, id. § 235-a; and the
duty of the landlord to provide written receipt of rent payments, id. § 235-e.
190. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b.
191. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 143-b (1992).
192. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (1974).
193. Id. at § 309. Several other important statutes allow: rent to be withheld by a
petition of one-third of the tenants, N.Y. REAL PROP. Acr art. 7A, § 770, and, a city
to place a building into receivership, allowing the city to make necessary repairs and
obtain a lien on all rents to insure reimbursement. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309.
194. See generally N.Y. Real Prop. Law art. 7 (McKinney 1989).
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roughs held that HUD, when rebuilding a dilapidated HUD-owned
property, could not preempt the entirety of local housing building
codes. 195 The New York rent regulations cannot be characterized
as the same broad schemes that courts protected from preemption
in Patterson and Burroughs. Thus, under the conflict preemption
analysis, § 1821(e)(1) gives the RTC the power to repudiate rent
regulated leases.
IV. The Balance of the Term in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(5)(A)
When the RTC, acting as conservator or receiver, disaffirms a
lease, "the lessee may either (i) treat the lease as terminated by
such repudiation; or (ii) remain in possession of the leasehold interest for the balance of the term."'196 At the surface, the phrase

"balance of the term" is rather simple to define. BLACK'S LAW
defines term, in connection with a lease as, "the pe' 97

DICIONARY

riod which is granted for the lessee to occupy the premises.'
Questions have consistently arisen as to whether the "balance of
the term" includes renewals. 198 Unfortunately, the legislative history of § 1821(e) is sparse, merely "confirm[ing] the historic right
of a conservator or receiver to disaffirm or repudiate contracts." 99
The question of renewals is left unanswered.
Courts have, however, recognized that Congress adopted this
section from § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). z°° Section 365(h)(1) stated that "the lessee ... may remain in possession
of the leasehold . . . under any lease . . . the term of which has
commenced for the balance of such term and for any renewal or
extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee. .. under
applicable nonbankruptcy law."' 20 ' Thus, the Bankruptcy Code al195. 564 F. Supp. 1007
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
197. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1471 (6th ed. 1990).

198. The implications of that question for leases governed by the rent regulations
are obvious. If renewals are included in the definition of the "balance of the term,"

then it is possible to conclude that the renewals, under the rent regulations, are

perpetual.

199. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 331 (1989), reprinted in, 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 127.
200. See, e.g., Franklin Fin. v. RTC, 53 F.3d 268 (9th Cir. 1995); Diamond I, 18 F.3d
111; Unisys Fin. Corp. v. RTC, 979 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1992).
201. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1). Recall that Congress amended the Code in 1994. The

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Section 365(h) now states that if the debtor is a lessor and
chooses to terminate the lease,

then the lessee under such lease may treat such lease as terminated by the
rejection; or... the lessee may retain its rights under such lease (including
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lows tenants of debtor landlords to stay for the remainder of the
20 2
term plus renewals.

Congress, in enacting § 365(h) of the Code, brought "clarity to3
an area of bankruptcy practice sorely in need of clarification. 2' 0
The legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to end the
struggle in the Courts over whether, under the Bankruptcy Code,
renewal terms are part of the lessee's estate. 0 4 Congress intended

to protect the balance of the term and renewals and to make sure
the lessee was not deprived of his estate. Regarding the inclusion

of both of the balance of the term and the renewals, the House
report states, "[tihus, the tenant will not be deprived of his estate
for the term for which [the tenant] bargained. 2 0 5 Therefore, because the Code included both the balance of the term and renewals, it would seem that Congress did not believe that the balance of
the term included renewal periods.
When interpreting the choice of language of one statute, there

is precedent for looking to another statute. 2 06 FIRREA, in
rights such as those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent
and other amounts payable by the lessee and any right of use, possession,
quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance of the term such lease and for
any renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
202. Case law indicates that when examining the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, it is appropriate to analyze its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act ("the
Act"). Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 502 U.S. 410, 418-20 (1992). The Act, as
amended by the Chandler Act, Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), stated that any repudiation of a lease by a trustee in bankruptcy shall not, "deprive the lessee of his estate."
11 U.S.C. § 110b (1964) repealed by, Bankruptcy Code (1978). Since the passage of
the Chandler Act and up to the passage of the Code, courts struggled with the meaning of the lessee's "estate." Professor James MacLachlan, one of the chief architects
of the Chandler Act, wrote, when discussing that section of the Act, "I had in mind
the general principals of property and of contract.., that a lease is a conveyance and
not just a contract." John J. Creedon and Robert M. Zinman, Landlord'sBankruptcy:
Laissez les Lessees, 26 Bus. Law. 1391 app. at 1439 (1971). Professor MacLachlan
went on to point out that the estate must be protected. Id. This is particularly so,
when considering the implications of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution.
203. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
For more information on the Bankruptcy Act's treatment of renewal terms, see generally Creedon and Zinman, supra note 202. See also Coy v. Title Guar. and Trust Co.,
198 F. 275 (D. Or. 1912).
204. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 349 (1978).
205. Id.
206. "It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when
it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another."
BFP v. RTC, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994) (quoting Chicago v. Environmental Defense
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§ 1821(e)(5)(A), speaks only of the "balance of the term." The
adoption of § 1821(e)(5)(A) from the Bankruptcy Code,2 °7 and the
Code's inclusion of both the balance of the term and renewals indicate Congressional intent to have a disaffirmed20tenant
remain only
8
for the balance of the term, and not renewals.
Assuming that the balance of the term does not include a re-

newal period, there remains the question of what is the balance of
the term of a rent regulated lease. For a rent stabilized lease, the

answer is fairly obvious. Since § 26-511c(4) of the rent stabilization
code provides that a landlord shall provide a one or two year renewal lease, the balance of the term is what remains of that lease.

The question, however, is considerably more difficult for a rent
controlled lease because the rent control code does not contem-

plate a lease term. In any rent controlled lease, there was a lease,
with a term, prior to the passage of rent control. Rent control
forces the landlord to extend that term for as long as the tenant
continues to pay rent.20 9 In Diamond I, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the term of a rent controlled lease is,
"two years, commencing on the January 1 of the last biennial review set by the statute prior to notice of repudiation. ' 210 The court
Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994)). This logic also applies when Congress creates one
statute by adopting it from another. In Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S.
125, 131 (1943), the Supreme Court defined the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) by referring to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), writing, "[the
statutes] are not strictly analogous, but they are similar... [w]e see no persuasive
reason why the scope of employed or engaged 'in commerce' [in the FELA] ...
should not be applied to the similar language in the FLSA."
207. See supra note 200 and the accompanying text.
208. If the RTC disaffirms a lease, allowing the lessee to stay only for the balance of
the term and not for any renewals, it is possible that this would create a Fifth Amendment 'takings' problem. As the Supreme Court has held, "[i]t has long been established that the holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled, under the
Fifth Amendment, to just compensation for the value of that interest when it is taken
upon condemnation by the United States." Alamo Land & Cattle Co., Inc., v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976). Thus, one issue that a court may face is whether a
renewal term is a part of an "unexpired leasehold interest." The Bankruptcy Act's
repudiation provision spoke of protecting that interest. Courts, in interpreting the
Bankruptcy Act, have come down on both sides of this issue. Unfortunately, the.
Bankruptcy Code does not use that phrase. Therefore, the case law on this issue is
limited to pre-Code cases, and is not likely to be developed significantly in the near
future. Compare,In the Matter of New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 153 F. Supp.
772 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (which did not allow a trustee in bankruptcy to reject a renewal),
with, Coy v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 198 F. 275 (D. Or. 1912) (which allowed a trustee
in bankruptcy to reject a renewal). This is, however, an extremely difficult issue that
remains to be resolved. See also Creedon & Zinman, supra note 202.
209.

RENT CONTROL CODE

§ 26-408a.

210. Diamond, 18 F.3d at 124.
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focused on the provision of the rent control code where the maxi-

mum rents are adjusted by the city rent agency every two years.2 '

The rent control code permits landlords to apply for rent in-

creases periodically; this periodic application is not equivalent to a
lease term. Rent control extends the term of the original lease
seemingly indefinitely or, at the very least, for the length of the
"housing emergency" that spurred the creation of rent control.

This is the conclusion the Second Circuit was apparently trying to
avoid. The court was concerned that if the balance of the term was
the remainder of the "emergency," the rent control code would

possibly face a constitutional challenge under the Fourteenth

Amendment as a "taking. 212 In Block v. Hirsh,2 1 3 the appellee, a

landlord, claimed that the District of Columbia's rent control statute was unconstitutional as an attempt to take property-his right

to regain possession after the expiration of the lease-without
compensation.2 4 The Supreme Court held that rent control was
not an unconstitutional taking requiring compensation, provided

that the rent restrictions were temporary, stating, "[a] limit in time,
to tide over a passing trouble, well may
justify a law that could not
215
be upheld as a permanent change.

The problem is that rent control in New York may no longer be
considered temporary. If the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-

cuit had held that the balance of the term of a rent controlled lease
lasts for the length of the "emergency," it would have come to the
absurd conclusion that rent control has extended lease terms to
211. RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-405a(4).
212. Diamond, 18 F.3d at 123. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states, in
its relevant part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The takings analysis of the Fifth Amendment,
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 11.6, at 386 n.34 (4th ed. 1991).

213. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
214. Id. at 153.
215. Id.'at 157. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 440 (1982). For more information on rent control as a taking, see R.S. Radford,
Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990's: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV.
1019 (1992); Michael D. Bergman, Property Law: Recent Developments in Rent Control and Related Laws Regulating the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 1989 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 691 (1991); Symposium, supra note 28; Note, The Constitutionality of Rent
Control Restrictions on Property Owners' Dominion Interests, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1067 (1987). A recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals may bring new
litigation on the issue of rent control as a regulatory taking. See Manocherian v.
Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994); R.S. Radford, Why Rent Control Is a

Regulatory Taking, 6

FORDHAM ENVTL.

L. 755 (1995).
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more than forty years in length.216 The Second Circuit, however, in
Diamond I, eager to avoid this conclusion, held that the time between possible rent adjustments provided "the strongest analogy to
a lease expiration. ' 217 When the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision,218 the Second Circuit took the opportunity to
reconsider its earlier opinion,, and modified its ruling on the balance of the term of a rent controlled lease. 19 While Diamond II
does make clear that the Second Circuit continued to search for the
closest analogy, 220 the decision does not state that the court sought
to avoid the "takings" problem by finding a fixed rent controlled
lease term. Instead, it modified its earlier decision to avoid allowing the RTC to repudiate a tenancy a few days before the end
of the term. 2 Citing New York State's recent law that decontrols
tenancies for wealthy families, 2 Diamond H held that the term
lasts until, "the first day of June in the year next succeeding the
22 3
filing of the certification of the owner.
This is still an analogy to an actual lease term. It is not a lease
term, per se. There will continue to be problems with the lease
term of a rent controlled lease, unless the rent control code is
amended to include a lease term. If the state or city legislatures
wish to protect tenant rights, they must define a lease term. Conversely, the RTC, as a Federal agency, does not concern itself with
the rights of rent regulated tenants who are not of low or moderate-income. 2 4 One possible solution is to amend the rent control
code to provide for renewal leases, similar to rent stabilization.2 5
Thus, the rent control code might state, "Beginning in 1995, the
terms of all rent controlled leases will be five years. At the expiration of such term, owners shall grant a renewal lease of five years.
Such renewal leases shall be subject to all other provisions of the
rent control code." If the state or city legislatures do not amend
216. RENT CONTROL CODE § 26-403(e)(1).
217. Diamond H,45 F.3d at 676.
218. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to allow the Second Circuit to is-

sue a new opinion, taking into account O'Melveny. See supra Part II D.
219. Diamond H, 45 F.3d at 668.

220. See Diamond II, 45 F.3d at 676, 677.
221. Id. at 676.
222. The law decontrols leases where the family income of the tenant exceeds
$250,000 annually and the monthly rent is above $2,000. 1993 Sess. Law News of
N.Y., 216th Legislature, Ch. 253 (McKinney 1993).
223. Diamond H, 45 F.3d at 677.

224. The RTC's goals are set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1421(b)(3)(C)(i) - (v). None of
the goals listed indicate that the RTC should be concerned with the Diamond tenants'
rights. See supra note 61 and the accompanying text.
225.

RENT STABILIZATION CODE

§ 26-511c(4).
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the rent control code similar to this hypothetical provision, rent
controlled tenants face uncertain court proceedings, which will determine the length of a rent controlled lease. In Diamond II, the
Second Circuit held that the term is two years. If a court found, for
example, that the term of a rent controlled lease was infinite, then
it might face a Fourteenth Amendment takings challenge. The
New York State and/or City legislatures have an opportunity to
bring clarity to this issue and protect the rent controlled tenants by
amending the rent control code.226
V.

Conclusion

Clearly, rent control leases are burdensome to the RTC. FIRREA includes the historic right of conservators and receivers to
disaffirm leases and contracts. When resolving the ability of the
RTC to disaffirm leases regulated by local law, there are two possible analyses: express preemption and conflict preemption.
The express preemption argument centers on the principles of
statutory construction. When attempting to construe the language
of a statute, it is often helpful to consider what other language
Congress may have used. Section 1821(e)(1) specifically uses "any
contract or lease." This language is tailored to preempt regulations
similar to the rent regulations. Even if the language is not clear,
the RTC, as a Federal agency deserves some deference in its interpretation of its governing statute.
Under conflict preemption, courts have been unwilling, at times,
to preempt a whole field of local law. Courts have allowed, however, federal entities to preempt specific local laws. In Diamond,
there is a clear conflict between the provisions of FIRREA and a
specific set of local laws: the rent regulations. The rent regulations
are a small part of a larger system of housing laws in New York.
Thus, FIRREA preempts the rent regulations. The leases can be
repudiated by the RTC under this analysis as well. Therefore,
under either the conflict preemption analysis, or the statutory construction analysis, the RTC has the power to disaffirm the rent regulated leases.
Once disaffirmed, FIRREA provides that the lessee may stay for
the balance of the term.. Based on a comparison to Bankruptcy
Law, on which § 1821(e) was based, Congress intended that the
lessee could stay only for the balance of the term, and not renew226. This conclusion, however, does not consider the propriety of the rent regulations themselves. See supra notes 52-55 and the accompanying text.
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als. The balance of the term of a rent stabilized lease is the remainder of the lease term, which normally would be renewed every one
or two years. Rent control, however, does not contemplate a lease
term. It extends the term of the lease indefinitely. Therefore, rent
control should be amended to deliniate specifically the term of a
rent controlled lease. A possible solution is to amend rent control
such that it provides an automatic renewal every one or two years,
similar to rent stabilization. If rent control is not amended, courts,
like the Diamond H court, will be forced to use the closest
analogy. 27
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227. 45 F.3d at 676-77.
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